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PROGRAM National Security Policy: The Exercise of Military Powers STATION WETA FM
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ANNOUNCER: From Washington, D. C., National Public Radio presents another in a series of hearing symposiums on National Security Policy and the Changing World Power Alignment. These hearings are being conducted by the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on National Security Policy in an attempt to determine what factors have shaped foreign policy in the past and what direction it will take in the future. The topic of this session is "The Exercise of Military Power."

Here now is the subcommittee chairman, Clement Zablocki of Wisconsin.

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI: We resume discussions on the subject of National Security Policy and the Changing World Power Alignment. Building on the broad strategic considerations which we attempted to outline last week, our specific concern today is the exercise of military power as that complex and often highly emotionally charged issue relates to a future viable and successful national security policy for the United States.

Simply and directly put, our objective is to understand how breakdowns in diplomacy and negotiations between nations lead to military conflict. Our hope is that by bettering understanding the nature and function of military power as an instrument for the conduct of foreign policy, the very use of military force can be prevented. It should be stressed that we are not limiting this discussion to nuclear holocaust between the great powers, a danger which our earlier witnesses agreed has receded. Rather, we hope to include in our deliberations the use of military force by small countries, the so-called wars by proxy, which may very likely increase in the future. One of the points which must be emphasized here is that we obviously cannot completely avoid reference to Vietnam. However, I trust you will agree that the future can better be served with sane and rational policies achieved if we look primarily to the future and not become involved in a war of our own, a war of recrimination over Vietnam.

Therefore, while we must look back as a means of understanding our mistake, our view today is, first and foremost, to the future.

Here today to help us in that task are six distinguished gentlemen whose background and experience well qualify them to speak on this subject. They are Paul Warnke, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; General Lyman Lemnitzer, Retired, former Army Chief of Staff and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Professor Amitai Etzioni of Columbia University and Director of the Center for Policy Research. And the panel discussants are: Mr. Leslie Gelb, Brookings Institution; Mr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., director of the Arms Control Association; and Professor Samuel P. Huntington of Harvard University, Department of Government.

General Gavin was invited also to be a participant, and he has filed a statement which will be made a part of the record of these hearings, entitled "The Role of National Power," by James M. Gavin.

Mr. Warnke, if you will begin. And before each of the presentations, I will give to the stenographer a biography of each. And in order to save time, I will not read the biographies but have them included in the permanent record.

Mr. Paul Warnke.

PAUL WARNKE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will with your permission, sir, summarize my statement. I understand that the full statement will appear in the record.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: We appreciate that very much, sir. It will.

WARNKE: We've been asked, Mr. Chairman, to discuss the role of military power as a tool for obtaining international objectives, including national security objectives. As my statement points out, I feel that military power is a blunt and inept instrument for the conduct of foreign policy. The purpose of military power today must be to defend against military attack. It has some residual value, I would suppose, in protecting American lives in brush fire situations. I feel, however, that any general feeling that military power can be of use in achieving either a stable world or a favorable international environment for the United States or for preserving peace, or for the exercise of political influence is badly to overstate the uses of military power in a nuclear age.

Accordingly, I suppose that we ought to consider its fallacies and abandon three of the factors that have been used in the past in designing, deploying, sometimes using military

power. We ought, first of all, to renounce the concept that somehow the United States has a worldwide peace-keeping role. Secondly, I think we ought to recognize that American military power is not of use and will only lead to trouble and the risk of the eventual nuclear holocaust if we endeavor to use it to prevent countries from going communist or switching to an anti-Western viewpoint because of internal developments.

The third fallacy I've suggested is that we overvalue, I think grossly, the political implications of military hardware when that military hardware is without any genuine military need.

I'd like to discuss, briefly, each of these three.

I recognize that with regard to the first, the espousal of a concept of the United States as the world's peace keeper, that this has, in fact, been abandoned in many of the phrasings of the Nixon Doctrine; that President Nixon has characterized his doctrine as being one of a lower American profile; and the rejection of any responsibility as the world's policeman.

But at the same time, there are, I feel, disquieting references to a general American peace-keeping role. For instance, as I've stated in my paper, on May 8th, 1970 in a press conference, the President referred to America's peace-keeping role in the Asian world. I think our experience in Southeast Asia has demonstrated that, in that role, we are very badly miscast.

In addition to that, at the Air Force Academy in June of 1969, President Nixon referred to the fact that America has a vital national interest in world stability. I would agree that we have a vital national interest in world stability. But I don't believe that that stability can be preserved by the application of American fire power.

So I think that the time has come for the United States to recognize that we should refrain from use of our military power in other people's quarrels in local or even regional conflict. I believe that the one thing that we can be certain of is that any heavy-handed intervention by American fire power and troops is just going to make a bad situation worse. Accordingly, I think we can all be grateful that despite the tragedy in the subcontinent of the past year, at least it did not reach the stage where outside military power was used, either by the Soviet Union or by the United States. That certainly would have been no favor to the desperate people of the area. And it would have just meant a superpower confrontation and the risk of all-out war.

I believe that, regrettably, there are going to be instances of local conflict. There are going to be instances in which countries won't let one another alone. There are going

to be border conflicts. There are going to be instances in which racial or ethnic hostility gives rise to actual warfare, to killing. But I suggest that these are not situations of major concern to our security interests. And they are not situations in which our use of our military power will either promote our own national security or promote world peace and stability. In such situations of local conflict, our general posture should be one of resort to diplomatic representations, attempts at mediation; certainly economic assistance; measures that might tend to eliminate the serious frictions that give rise to the local conflict.

I would hope that over a period of years the United Nations could genuinely play a peace-keeping role. But I don't believe that the world is going to put up with a situation in which any one nation arrogates unto itself that peace-keeping function. They're going to regard it as having the ingredients of an imperium rather than the ingredients of peace.

I suggested that the second myth about the use of American military power is that somehow it can be used generally to contain communism. I would separate out, Mr. Chairman, the concept of protecting us against Soviet power from the concept of trying to protect the world against communism. I don't believe that ideas can effectively be fought by military courts. I believe instead that that sort of competition has to exist at the political level, and that competing ideologies ought to wage their battle in economic terms, in terms of what the respective systems can do for their own people and what they can do for the world.

Accordingly, I think again the time has come to abandon the concept of containment of communism by military force. We can't, of course, relax our vigilance against the threat of Soviet expansion. We can't be sure yet of what Soviet intentions are. All we can be sure of is their capabilities, and their capabilities remain immense.

But I believe that we can recognize, and should recognize, that the United States has no effective role to play in counterinsurgency and that we should not cast ourselves ever again in the unpopular and unrewarding role of shoring up unpopular foreign governments that are faced with internal dissatisfaction and rebellion. If a government cannot be safe from its own people, than United States' intervention is not going to remedy that situation. And I don't believe that we should go to war to impose an unpopular government on any foreign people.

To me, as I've suggested in my paper, that is the mirror image of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The Brezhnev Doctrine is a claim that Soviet power may be used to preserve the doctrinal purity of sister socialist states. I find it a thoroughly abhorrent doctrine, and I don't think that we should follow it, even though

we feel that our doctrine, that our system, that that which we would seek to spread throughout the world is infinitely preferable to the communist system.

Again, I think that there are many hopeful signs in the foreign policy that is evolving. But here again there are still nostalgic, and I find disturbingly nostalgic, references to our role in preserving the stability of existing governments. One such occurred very shortly after the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine in Guam in 1969 when President Nixon went to Thailand and said there that America would be proud to stand with the Thai government against those who threaten it from abroad or from within.

I prefer, as I've suggested, to regard this as the enthusiasm of a guest rather than a serious prediction of American military intervention to preserve the status quo, either in Thailand or in any place else.

Feeling as I do that counterinsurgency is not a worthy or a useful exercise of American military power, I was glad to see that in this year's statement of the Secretary of Defense there has been abandoned a chart which has appeared in previous years. That chart suggested that among the threats that American military power must face were, first of all, political agitation and, secondly, insurgency, then moving up to the areas of threatre conventional conflict and to eventual nuclear conflict.

Our own Declaration of Independence has affirmed the right of a people to alter or to abolish its form of government. Accordingly, no foreign government should look to us for protection from internal change.

The third fallacy that I've suggested in my paper is the extreme political value which sometimes is attributed to possession of military hardware in excess of any practical need for military use. There are repeated references to the political, as distinguished from the military, consequences of our defense posture. In the statement this year by Admiral Moorer, General Lemnitzer's successor, he referred to the fact that the mere appearance of Soviet strategic superiority could have a debilitating effect on our foreign policy and that it could erode the confidence of our friends and allies, even though the superiority would have no practical effect. I think that a similar reaction is evident sometimes with respect to the presence of Soviet ships, not only in the Mediterranean but increasingly in the Indian Ocean. I believe that the show of the Russian flag on the Indian Ocean certainly may increase third country awareness of Soviet military power. But I question whether it threatens America's national security.

Feeling as I do with respect to this third attribute, I welcome the SALT agreement which was concluded last week by President Nixon. I think that that was a realistic recognition

of the fact that the Soviet Union gains nothing from its sixteen hundred ICBM's that we don't have and have an abundance with our one thousand [sic]. I think also that that recognizes that the numerical edge in submarine launched ballistic missiles is of no military significance as long as we possess the ability to destroy the Soviet Union in the event of a first strike.

To me the big asset of the SALT agreement is the recognition and acceptance of the concept of mutual assured destruction; the fact that the deterrent is the certainty on the part of the attacking country that they will be destroyed in retaliation.

Now with the restrictions on antiballistic missile systems, both sides have had to recognize their total vulnerability to a retaliatory strike. And as long as that restriction exists, then the accumulation of more and more nuclear warheads, more and more missiles, more and more bombers is really just an indication of the -- of the myth to which Winston Churchill referred, that unfortunately with regard to nuclear weapons some people like to see the rubble bounce. All that these weapons would do would be to bounce the rubble in the event of a nuclear exchange.

I think that we ought to recognize that military posturing is no longer of any appeal in the Third World, that the day of gunboat diplomacy died with the empires, that developing nations now have far more serious concerns than evaluating the relative cosmetic appeal of meaningless military might. We should, therefore, be content and confident if in our defense program we buy only what we need to protect our national security interests. And I believe that those national security interests are readily identifiable. The only country that can threaten us militarily at the present time is the Soviet Union. They are deterred effectively from any use of their strategic nuclear forces. I would agree with General Lemnitzer that we should continue to maintain a strong posture in Europe. I think that time has shown that this is a prudent investment and that with a strong NATO, bolstered -- and I think inescapably bolstered by a substantial American military presence, we have a situation of which the Soviet Union cannot be tempted to engage in military adventurism and even the limited use of conventional force. We have, and we should retain, the conventional capability to deter and, if necessary, to defeat any such attempt by the Soviets. I think as long as we have that capability that it will never be tested.

Apart from Europe, I believe that our major security concern must be that Japan's industrial strength and the infinite capacity of its people do not fall into hostile hands. Again, this is something that can be done with a far more modest level of military expenditure than we have at the present time. I've suggested that the Soviet Union constitutes the only present military threat. Even in prospect, China is not a formidable

military power, unless you get engaged in a land war in Asia. Certainly our air and naval strength is sufficient against the virtually nonexistent amphibious capability of China. And certainly the moves that have been made in the past year to rectify and improve the relations between China and the United States should serve as further assurance against any senseless shift in Chinese policy towards overt aggression.

I believe that we have learned a lot in the last decade about the limited uses of American military power. I think the time has come for us to translate this hardly won knowledge into effective arms control agreements and effective reductions in our own military budget. I don't believe that a realistic recognition of the severe limits on military power should be equated with a policy of neo-isolationism. The two are not equivalent or even comparable. We can continue to wish the world well without feeling that we have to act as its sheriff. We can continue to participate in world affairs through diplomacy, through political negotiations, through the United Nations. And we can find, I think, that if we recognize realistically the limits on our military force, we will find that we are a greater world power and a more effective and more constructive world force.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Our next witness will be Mr. Amitai Etzioni. Excuse me. I'm taking it out of order. General Lemnitzer, if you'll proceed, sir, please.

GENERAL LYMAN LEMNITZER (Ret.): Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, ladies and gentlemen. In response to the subcommittee's request that we explore the role of military power, I'm going to address my remarks and summarize the paper which I submitted to three questions; namely, how is military power exercised as a deterrent or a threat. The Nixon Doctrine: what does it imply in terms of future entanglements abroad. And, third, what are the alternatives to single nation power.

As a starting point, let me remind you that we and expect to remain a world power, the leader of the Western world. Our interests are not confined to United States' territory and the surrounding territorial waters. Further, our security cannot be preserved from within a fortress America. Certainly under the Nixon Doctrine, it is the announced policy of the United States to reduce the military forces deployed in many overseas areas and to expect our allies...

(Tape turned.)

...To a degree, our strategic nuclear forces can contribute to a solution of the problem by the deterrence which they provide

through the potential for responding to an initial nuclear attack upon us. Let me emphasize, however, that strategic nuclear forces are valuable only in connection with all-out general war. The capability for massive nuclear retaliation has clearly proved itself unable to prevent lesser conflicts such as Korea in the early 1950's and in Vietnam.

While I believe that we may be able to curtail to a degree some of the military resources we devote to our (technical difficulties)... our dealings with other nations, which some people take as evidence of a basic change in our outlook and objectives, as well as our manner. But some very important factors remain unchanged. Unchanged. One is the Soviet determination to continue toward their long-range objective of communist world domination. Soviet leaders may no longer pound their shoes on the desks at the United Nations. But we have the case of the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia to demonstrate that the Soviets are just as prompt as ever to react forcibly and with ruthless efficiency to any development that they consider might force a relaxation of the degree of control they exercise over their satellites. It's the tanks and bayonets of the Soviet Army that extract extract the degree of subservience required from their satellites to advance Soviet state policy.

Accordingly, the only real change is, as I have said, merely a change in style. Underneath the polish, the steel of Soviet determination is as cold and hard as ever.

The other fact that remains unchanged is the importance of the security of Western Europe to the security of the United States. President Nixon's foreign policy report states, and I quote: "The peace of Europe is crucial to the peace of the world. This truth, a lesson learned at terrible cost twice before in the Twentieth Century, is the central principle of United States foreign policy. For the foreseeable future, Europe must be the cornerstone of structuring a durable peace." Unquote.

In brief, we cannot afford to contemplate a Western Europe dominated by the Soviet Union. But consider from the European point of view the fact that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact satellites still have about five million men under arms, the great bulk of which are stationed west of the Urals facing NATO's Allied Command Europe. These are far larger forces than are required solely for the purpose of defense. Consider the rapidly expanding strength of the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean and the other oceans of the world. Consider the record of the Soviet Union for resorting to naked military force to advance Soviet state policy behind the Iron Curtain; Czechoslovakia being the most recent example.

And if you choose to think of Czechoslovakia as being an internal communist bloc matter, relate it to countries outside of the Soviet orbit. Consider the Soviet role in exploiting

tensions and seeking opportunities to advance their goals in Egypt, Algeria, Hanoi, Cuba and, most recently, in the subcontinent of Asia -- India and the Indian Ocean. The Soviets have shown a capacity to use their strength not only directly, but in the form of blackmail. I submit that if it were not for NATO, Western Europe would be openly vulnerable to threats of blackmail. Even together, Western European nations do not have the capacity by themselves to offset the military threat which the Soviets could bring to bear against them. Putting it another way, we cannot afford to leave this vital element of our security to other nations, even though they are our friends and allies when their strength alone is inadequate to the task.

In February of 1969, President Nixon pointed out, and I quote again: "NATO can be credited with the fact that while Europe has endured its share of crises in the past twenty years, the ultimate crisis that would have provoked a nuclear war has been prevented. Those nations that were free twenty years ago are free today. Thus in its original purpose, NATO has been a resounding success." Unquote.

Now, there are some Americans who hold that the only thing which gives meaning to NATO is the American nuclear capability. From this, they argue that there's no need for deployment to Europe of balanced military forces in more than token strength. My answer is that Europe is the one overseas area which combines three characteristics which are crucial to the United States. One of these characteristics is, as I have previously said, that the United States' interests involved are vital.

The second is that the danger of any conflict in Europe developing into an all-out world war is greater than in any other prospective combat arena. Consequently, deterring war in Europe is of the utmost importance.

The third characteristic, stemming in part from the second and in part from the limitations of massive nuclear retaliation by itself and the geographical realities which are involved, is that space and time for effective resistance to attack in Europe are severely limited. In brief, to prevent a war in Europe, we, with our allies, must have the capability available on the spot to raise serious doubts in the minds of the Soviets that they could achieve even a limited military objective without paying an unacceptable price. Strategic reserves in the United States together with strategic air and sea lift are, of course, very important. But in this case, they cannot substitute for forces in position in Europe, fully manned, appropriately armed and familiar with the ground over which they will be fighting.

In this country the question is frequently asked -- and it's a fair one -- why is it necessary for the United States to continue having military forces in Europe to defend nations increasingly able to provide for their own defense? My answer

is that they are not there only to defend European nations, but to defend the United States as well. The best place to defend the United States, Canada, Belgium and the other NATO nations is along the present Iron Curtain, as long as the Warsaw Pact nations insist on it being an Iron Curtain, which they do. Such a presence is visible evidence to our allies of our ability and readiness to meet limited as well as all-out attacks. It is a visible evidence also that we still honor our commitments. Without such a presence it would be less possible for our allies and our potential enemy to have any genuine belief in the validity of any merely nuclear guarantee which we might make.

With regard to the strength of our NATO deployments, the fact is that we have already made substantial reductions in the United States forces we maintain in Europe. During the period that I was Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, from 1963 to 1969, United States forces in Europe were reduced from four hundred and eight thousand to two hundred and eighty-five thousand, a reduction of a hundred and twenty-three thousand. In my opinion, our present NATO forces in Europe are now at the minimum level consistent with the assigned mission and the known enemy, and the known capabilities of the potential enemy. Indeed, in some areas they are already below prudent levels.

Not only is there no military justification whatsoever for reducing NATO forces, United States forces or those of our allies, there are important political reasons as well for not doing so. In June of 1968, the NATO foreign ministers after our meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, in the interests of lessening tension in Europe and in reducing the danger of war in Europe, declared firmly their readiness to explore the mutual balanced reduction of forces and practical steps for arms control. And they called on the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellites to join in a search for progress toward those ends. Until May, 1971 the offer was ignored and was still lying on the table when Leonid Brezhnev at the time of the proposed Senate amendment to reduce our forces by fifty percent, seeing the possibility of exploiting the situation, indicated his support for the reduction, which is known by the letters MBFR.

Since then, however, the Soviet Union has indicated no interest in getting these talks underway. Thus the game goes on, with the Soviets smugly sitting back awaiting the next effort by legislative means to force a unilateral and substantial reduction of United States forces in Europe while they maintain, untouched, their massive military capability which is far greater than that required for defense.

In 1969, the Soviets, as they have on several previous occasions, proposed a so-called European security conference. This was, in my opinion, a transparent attempt to get the United States and Canada out of Europe. Another obvious purpose and primary purpose of their proposal is to obtain the agreement

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of the West to accept, agree, recognize and legitimize their hegemony; that is, their dominance over the satellites in the years ahead.

I and many NATO political and military officials firmly believe that until there is an agreement by the Warsaw Pact and NATO in response to NATO's urgent offer for a mutual balanced force reduction, with provision for a positive and reliable cheat-proof verification on both sides, any further reduction of forces in Europe by the United States or any of our NATO allies would be the wrong action at the wrong time.

I do not mean to suggest any blind opposition to a political agreement or military arrangement for the reduction of forces aimed at lessening tensions. No military man who has experienced the pain and destruction of war firsthand would oppose a true detente in Europe.

In conclusion then, I feel strongly that the successful record of the NATO alliance to date is much too important and impressive to justify any actions being taken that would jeopardize its continued success in the future. The NATO alliance, communist propaganda to the contrary notwithstanding, was at its inception, and is today, a solely collective -- defensive collective security arrangement. It threatens no one.

After twenty-three years of NATO, what have been the results? The simple facts are that NATO, Europe has experienced twenty-three years of peace. There have been fifty-one wars in the world since World War II -- in Korea, Vietnam, the Asian subcontinent, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, but not in a NATO area. During a twenty-three year period, not one square inch of NATO territory has been lost to communist aggression. Also during that period, there has been more stability in Western Europe than that continent has experienced in more than a century.

I submit that this happy condition did not come about by accident. It has been achieved by twenty-three years of NATO effort and defensive vigilance. NATO stands today as the one proven successful means of halting communist aggression without resort to war. Twice before in this century, in World Wars I and II, Americans have had to fight in Europe when peace and order broke down. Today we stand there with our NATO allies as part of a strong alliance team that has successfully prevented aggression against NATO for twenty-three years. The United States' military contribution to the alliance -- land, sea and air -- is of critical importance and cannot and should not be lightly set aside or reduced. These forces, as NATO as a whole, are there solely for defensive purposes, and they threaten no one.

In previous wars fought by alliances in this century, the need for a military structure in being, such as that that

has been built up in NATO, was amply demonstrated. However, its construction in previous wars had to be improvised after a war had begun. This was accomplished barely in time to avert disaster, but in all cases at a tragically unnecessary cost in lives, property and other resources. But in a great North Atlantic alliance, NATO, we already have, for the first time in history, the organizational structure with commanders and staff functioning with up-to-date operational defense plans. We have national military units completely familiar with their defensive missions and located where they can carry out those missions on short notice. To dismantle or weaken such a proven, effective structure, with the fate of Czechoslovakia before us as to the stark lesson as to the nature of our possible adversaries, would, in my opinion, be to repay success with great risk and folly.

That is why our forces, together with those of our allies, should remain in Europe in at least their present strength until the Soviet Union and the members of the Warsaw Pact reveal their real intentions with regard to a mutual reduction of forces which they profess so strongly to support.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Thank you, General Lemnitzer.

Professor Amitai Etzioni, if you'll proceed, sir.

PROFESSOR AMITAI ETZIONI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to discuss with you today something which I've chosen to call the politician's temptation. It's not the usual sort of thing that we think of when we talk about temptations, but nevertheless such temptation is both ever present and immensely important.

What I'm referring to is a politician's temptation to use military power in the foreign policy arena. What I hope to suggest to you today is that cooler heads, and particularly cooling institutions like the Congress, must prevail if the United States is to resist, as it must, the impulse of -- the impulsive use of military force. Like other temptations, military power is seductive. Military action is immediate; it is concrete; it is dramatic. In an age of television and communication satellites, a military response communicates a foreign policy posture instantaneously in all too living color. What's more the application of military force has certain immediate psychological payoffs. A bold military action speaks directly to the troubled psyche of a confused and frustrated nation. More than any other instrument of foreign policy, the military is inextricably bound up with the nation's self-image: spirits are raised, new hopes are given that a nation united under one flag mobilizes for war, obeys the orders of the commander-in-chief. Indeed, no act, perhaps even the sexual act itself, so potently flatters a nation's sense of

its own masculinity.

It is therefore not surprising that a politician -- and I use the term in a pejorative sense to contrast it with a version of true and wise leaders -- have [sic] come to the signpost of the easy use of military power. We should not be at all surprised to see politicians plunging recklessly ahead ignoring long-term considerations and pandering instead to the pressures for short-term dramatic, crowd pleasing acts.

Gentlemen, this is a very small planet and our bombs are very large. There often is a bitter antagonism between short-run gains and longer-run policy goals, and you must have the vision to see beyond today's headlines to the problems of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. As a nation, the United States must learn to be more tolerant of occasional short-term losses if it is to achieve long-run successes.

I'm not suggesting that this is an easy task. However, there are powerful historical forces at work which will help to resist the pressure to seek foreign policy [word unintelligible]. Let me mention just a few.

There is a domestic priority in increasing concern with reforming our own society rather than involving this nation in the affairs of others. There is an ending of ideology, a growing awareness that we are not always the good guys and they are not always the bad guys. There is a dissipation of nationalism, less joy in the use of force in our collective name, more concern about the effects of military intervention, a fear that new small steps will lead to more Vietnams, or worse. Military heads have lost much of their domestic legitimacy and influence. And hence while the present new action in Indochina may yield a few percentage points upward jump in his popularity, the gain is soon run out leaving a citizenry which is increasingly disenchanted with warring and resentful that promises implied in short [word unintelligible] have not borne out fruit.

To state that the temptation to use military power should be often and long resisted is not to suggest that the exercise of might is never appropriate or right. As long as there are superpowers armed with nuclear strike capacities, a nation disarming itself will leave its future and fate at the mercy of a feeble international conscience.

There's little doubt in my mind that the current no war relations between the superpowers is maintained by the logical mutual deterrent of one military power holding the other one at bay. But this also means that any use of military power could, by stepping on the escalator, carry us to ever higher levels of conflict up to unbalancing the balance of terror and wreaking its horrible content on all of us.

Hence, the advent of nuclear weapons increases rather

than reduces the need for careful review of any international force.

In the American form of government, the military is supposed to be restrained by a Congress which alone has the prerogative to declare wars and it can alone appropriate money for these wars. This must now be interpreted to include all acts of war short of declaration of war.

And there is another problem. Congress must often act on information provided to it by the executive. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution is only the most recent and perhaps glaring example of the dependence of the Congress on the executive for crucial facts. But it's impossible for Congress to have its own intelligence gathering network. It seems to me that Congress ought to give more consideration to how to deal with the information the executive does provide. Congress might well want to impose severe penalties, perhaps even make it a new class of crime or constitution offense, for government officials to knowingly provide false information to the nation's legislators. And the staff of congressional committees should be increased and provided with more resources to be able to more effectively probe the softness of data provided by the executive from statistical body counts to claims about the success of bombing raids. Continued use of empty quantification should be prevented. Aside from misleading Congress, it makes the executive believe in its compulsions.

Turning from the general to the specific, it might be useful at this point to continue to ask ourselves how the United States became involved in Indochina and what lessons we can learn from the tragedy of that war. After careful study and thought, it seems to me that our involvement in Indochina was the result of certain basic involving mechanisms, and that many of these mechanisms are still with us.

Here are some examples. We supported and support local elites which have little popularity, little local support, flagging legitimacy and indiscernible effectiveness. We failed to perceive that we cannot remove those factors which agitate against those elites and ourselves, because we're unable to commit sufficient resources to the problem. We really cannot pay for the development of the economy of even a small nation, let alone a sovereign state. We drastically overestimate our capacity to teach local elites the way to gain support, legitimacy and effectiveness. We misunderstand the domestic forces at home which have a way of leading from small paramilitary, subvisible interventions abroad to ever bigger involvements. Take for instance the role of CIA operations and military advisers -- intervention in persons rather than providing materiel or funds. These frequently are insufficient, but also escalatory because once Air America is in trouble, the CIA operations need additional help, or if our advisers are killed, we find it difficult not to send in ever larger forces.

Therefore, it seems advisable to provide extra scrutiny whenever American personnel is involved. To make it possible, CIA operations should be separated from intelligence gathering; a step desirable on other grounds as well. And no CIA operative or military adviser should be sent to a country without Congress's advice and consent. These acts should be defined as what they are: acts of war.

And last and most important point, our involvement in Indochina was based on a mistaken judgment as what the role of the United States should be in local conflicts in general. A review of the past decade shows that the odds are generally quite high that military intervention by the United States is often not necessary to prevent a country from losing its autonomy, and interventions often have counterproductive results.

At one time or another, congressmen, commentators and analysts of foreign policy openly declare that this or that country was about to be lost to communism. This was stated about Ghana under Nkrumah, about Egypt following the Aswan Dam deal with the Soviet Union, about Syria under countless leftist generals, about Guinea under Toure, Indonesia under Sukarno, Brazil under Goulart, and many other countries. However, we were restrained from military intervention in all these countries, and they righted themselves.

In some instances we decided to step in. We landed Marines in Lebanon in 1958 and the Dominican Republic in 1965. But now it is widely agreed that at least these two of our interventions were based on faulty information and miscalculations of the risks involved in staying out. Most experts now agree that those nations would have remained as free as they are now even if we had not stayed -- even if we had stayed away.

At other times in other countries, U. S. intervention did little to stop an ongoing force and, at worst, helped to escalate the involvement of others. As I testify today, the communist intervention in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam is immeasurably greater than when the United States first entered the picture.

Of course, there are exceptions. It is possible that Guatemala would have shared the fate of Cuba if the United States had not become involved; that South Korea might well have fallen into the hands of the Communist North; and Taiwan might have possibly been reunited with the Mainland. Of course, there is a difficult human, moral and legal question whenever we can completely refrain from intervening under any given set of circumstances. Nevertheless, one thing is beyond reasonable doubt. To use military power too often, too quickly, at tremendous cost often leads to results which are neither in line with our goals or in the welfare of anyone involved or affected. Congress could and should set up more effective screenings through which the exercise of military power would have to pass before it

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takes effect. Better we would act once too late than to [words unintelligible] too often, too hard, unwisely.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Thank you, Professor Etzioni.

We'll now hear from the three participants. And if you do have prepared statements, they'll be made a part of the record at this point. I have one from Mr. Herbert Scoville. And if the others -- Mr. Huntington, Mr. Gelb, if you have them, we'll enter them. At the present time, we'll ask for you to comment on the statements just made, add to them and ask questions, and we will, as members of the subcommittee, as well, interject our questions.

Mr. Scoville, would you want to begin to comment on the testimony here thus far, or are your views in addition to those made?

HERBERT SCOVILLE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think I might comment just briefly on the sorts of questions raised by Mr. Warnke, and particularly emphasize perhaps a few points that have come up as a result of the recent agreements in Moscow limiting strategic weapons and how they may affect our military power situation.

First, I think we should recognize that having reached an agreement to limit ABM's to the extent that they will not provide protection to the populations of both the United States and the U. S. S. R., we are accepting and legislating a condition of mutual vulnerability and, as such, guaranteeing a situation of mutual deterrence. Now while this situation has probably existed in fact for many years, this is the first time that I think both countries have recognized this in a legal form.

Now, I think it's important to realize what that really means. It means that nuclear blackmail, as well as nuclear attack, is essentially ruled out, unless we talk ourselves into being blackmailed by nuclear weapons. A blackmail attempt has no validity if both sides know that by following through on the blackmail attempt they are committing national suicide. And that is exactly what the situation is as a result of the agreed ABM limitation at Moscow.

I think the real problem is that people don't like to live under this kind of situation or recognize that they live under it. And you find still today after the Moscow agreement the prophets of doom decrying the agreement because the Soviets will have one or two or ten or a hundred more missiles when, as Mr. Warnke has pointed out, both sides already have enough extra nuclear weapons to make the rubble bounce not once, but several times over.

The problem is that these prophets of doom are doing ourselves a real disservice. Because if we talk ourselves into a position of weakness and if we allow our allies to think that perhaps because of some weakness we are not going to be staunch in their support, then this weakness may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. And actually, we may even provide temptation, which Professor Etzioni is worried about, to the other side to try and benefit from this weakness which really doesn't exist.

So what I'm really saying is that I think that the real difficulty in the situation at the moment is not to allow people to talk ourselves into a position of weakness which really doesn't exist and can't exist in a situation where we have a guaranteed mutual deterrent situation.

Now the second point I'd like to make is that in light of this agreement at Moscow to limit strategic weapons, what should we be doing about our own military programs and our security programs. I think most of you will remember that during the past three or four years most of our new weapons programs have been justified on the score that the Soviets might at some stage in the game have a very large nationwide ABM, or, secondly, that they might increase the numbers of their very large ICBM's, the so-called SS-9's or so-called big holes, which they haven't filled yet, or actually by building more submarines and continuing to build submarines so that we would have to have more submarines ourselves. These were the elements which were used as justification for expanding our own strategic weapons programs.

Now as a result of the agreements at Moscow, a large-scale ABM has been foreclosed on both sides. Secondly, the numbers of large ICBM's has been frozen at existing levels, and they cannot now increase to the five hundred or so which was much feared a few years ago. And finally, the Soviets will be frozen in the number of submarines they can have. Granted that the agreement does not have any effect on qualitative improvements nor, unfortunately, does it prevent shifting from one type of force to another. In other words, you can transfer ICBM's to submarines missiles, and so on. But nevertheless, these three factors -- the three factors which, for the last three or four years, have been used as excuses for building new weapons have now been taken care of at SALT.

So I think it is incumbent on all of us, and particularly for the administration working in consultation with the Congress -- and I think the Congress can provide a very useful function in this -- to look at these weapons programs in light of the new situation and decide really which ones need to be carried forward for a real military purpose. If we restrict our military programs to those which are needed for real security purposes and do not go ahead with every weapons program just because it is not banned specifically in the agreement in Moscow, then the Moscow agreements can really amount to very important steps

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toward limiting our armaments, toward improving our security, and for providing large amounts of money to be put into other very critical social needs, which, in the long run, will probably increase our national strength and our security far more than the addition of more weapons.

Now, finally, I think that it is important to then also look at where we can move in the arms control areas as a result of this first phase in the strategic arms limitation as a result of Moscow. Admittedly, this is a first stage. There are many weaknesses and many things in the agreement which are not foreclosed which we would like to see foreclosed. Primarily, of course, these are the qualitative improvements in weapons system. This is a very unfortunate loophole in the present agreement, and we should move rapidly to try and close it. And the best way to move rapidly in that direction is to exercise restraint in the meantime and not, as I said a moment ago, build every new weapon just because it's not specifically banned. That is the surest way not to make any further progress.

And I think we should not just restrict ourselves to closing the loopholes that existed in the agreement, but we should move on to other areas. I agree very heartedly with what General Lemnitzer said, that it is important to try and achieve agreement with the Soviets to have mutual balanced force reductions in Europe. I think the security of Europe will be greatly increased if both sides can reduce their forces in Europe. This is not only conventional forces; this is the nuclear forces that are in Europe as well. And I think we've got to start to make the step to reduce these forces, because then Europe will be much more secure than it will be under the threat of a nuclear conflagration. After all, a nuclear conflagration doesn't save Europe; it only destroys it.

So I think there are lots of things we can do. I would just like to emphasize that we must recognize that the Moscow agreements have brought a new situation. We must act as if it was a new situation and not follow what have been really very blind alleys of our programs of the past few years.

Thank you.

Mr. Gelb. REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Thank you, Mr. Scoville.

LESLIE GELB: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to make one comment and then put some questions on the table for your three witnesses, if I may.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Surely.

GELB: The area in which I'd like to comment hasn't been raised by any of the witnesses. It's a very important

to talk about. It is the manner in which defense expenditures are justified and explained to the American people. I believe that this whole process of justifying the defense budget to the Congress and the public needs to be revolutionized.

A common practice, as I think we all know, has been to exaggerate and overdramatize. Threats are painted in imminence, right around the corner, tomorrow. An adversary's new ship or missile or tank is painted as a harbinger of doom, something that will tip the military balance in a matter of weeks, if not within the year.

People who have worked inside the administration know, I believe, that these are exaggerations. We've seen just in the past three years, Mr. Chairman, members of this administration, as previous -- as was the case in previous administrations, say one year that the Soviets are developing a system which will be deployed in two years, which will threaten our nation's safety. And in the next year, after prodding by the Congress and by the press, they will admit that, well, maybe the system isn't as powerful as they said two years ago and maybe it won't be deployed two years hence, but seven or eight years hence.

Somehow the crush of political pressure in Washington compels leaders in our government to say things that they know to be an exaggeration. They think this is the only way to sell defense expenditures to the American people and Congress -- to exaggerate and overdramatize. But somehow you wouldn't have the sport unless you bent over backwards to prove your case.

Now this isn't an idle speculation on my part. I think if you look at the literature of memoirs of presidents and people who've served in the executive branch that you will see that they admit this. They do it for what they believe to be the best interests of the country. I think they believe the defense expenditures are required for our national security and that, in order to get what is required, they need to oversell.

The slogans for overselling vary from time to time. One year is we can't afford to let the Soviets get ahead. Another year it's we can't be second best to Soviet power. More recently it's been we need to build armaments as bargaining chips. Invariably, we keep those bargaining chips after we build and deploy them.

I think the essential issue in defense expenditures for the seventies and beyond is restoring the credibility of those defense expenditures. Most of those expenditures are required. I think they make sense. But by overselling and overstating the case, one expands the credibility gap and places in jeopardy defense expenditures that make sense. And I think we've got to change this. And I think the Congress has to hold the executive branch's feet to the fire in order to do it.

Let me now raise some questions that I'd be interested

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in...

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Let me ask you a question...

GELB: Yes, sir.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: ...about the bargaining chips. Would we indeed have had success in the SALT Talks if we did not have the so-called bargaining chips on our side of the table?

GELB: In my judgment, we would have the same agreement without ever having deployed any of the missile site defenses. And I think an alternative all along was to hold the funds in escrow pending the SALT agreement. And if the agreement did not prove to be negotiable, to consider then whether or not to deploy the system. As it is, we've spent funds and begun deployment on sites that will not be completed. And as it is, we've ended up agreeing to keep two sites, neither of which I think is necessary, and both of which could have been eliminated had not we begun to move down the road of deployment.

The real negotiating factor -- this is the bargaining chip we had -- was the potential to deploy these systems, not the actualization of their deployment.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: But to what extent was the problem of the Soviet Union with China, which outweighed even the bargaining chips we had on our side of the table as far as our military force?

You didn't seem to mention that.

GELB: I think that was probably a more important factor to the Soviet Union than our Safeguard deployments.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Perhaps we ought to hear Mr. Huntington. Then we'll go right into questions.

Mr. Huntington.

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I submitted a statement for the record...

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: It will be a part of the record of this...

HUNTINGTON: ...which I won't even attempt to summarize here but will simply make a few references to it in the context of making a few very brief comments on the remarks we've heard here this morning.

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that the most fundamental change which is taking place in world politics at the present time concerns the United States. Between 1945 and 1965, there was a great imbalance of power in world politics. World politics was Washington centered, and its dominant feature was the political, economic and military preeminence of the United States.

All this is clearly changing and changing drastically. These changes I think are manifested in a variety of developments. And the decline of support for a national role abroad among our public is certainly the most important sign of this change in the American role. The development by the Soviet Union of its own military power, both in the strategic field and in the conventional field; hence the conventional capability and the ability to project its military power overseas; in the emergence of Europe, Japan and China as major independent actors on the world scene, which makes this, in some sense, a pentagonal world; and the development of a number of local regional powers in the Third World who are able to play very important roles in exerting their influence within their own region.

I think the decline of American hegemony in this sense has been accompanied by the rise of what could be called local hegemony -- India in the subcontinent, Iran in the Persian Gulf, Brazil in Latin America, the Union of South Africa in Africa. These are some of the more obvious cases. All of this makes the world very different than it was just a few years ago.

Now so far as the implications of this for American security are concerned, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me there are many fairly clear-cut and important implications, many of which have been outlined by the speakers here this morning. I would argue that the emergence of this more complex power alignment has one important implication in that it means that for the foreseeable future only the Soviet Union can pose a significant threat to American security, and that what we have to be concerned about really is that threat and not the threat of global communism. It seems to me that the idea of a communist bloc acting in unison with some goal of worldwide domination just does not accord with the facts at the present time. And, consequently, our military activity has to be directed primarily towards the Soviet Union as the one significant potential threat to our security. And we must take full accord of the fact that the communist world is very far from being a monolith. And in this respect, I think I would dissent from the interpretation of Soviet goals which General Lemnitzer has put forward today.

It does not seem to me that it is useful and relevant to think of Soviet policy as being directed to the goal of communist world domination. Or perhaps I might say it is about as useful and relevant as to think that U. S. policy is being directed toward the goal of world democracy.

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In this respect, I would thoroughly endorse the remarks made by Paul Warnke and by Amatai Etzioni on the limited interests which the United States has in conflicts among nonmajor powers, particularly conflicts which involve domestic or civil strife within other states. In most countries, indeed in most of the world, it seems to me governments can fall and boundaries change with little damaging impact on U. S. security interests.

A second implication of this change for the maintenance of American national security, it seems to me, is that diplomacy will increase in importance in comparison to the role of military force. In a bipolar world naturally military force has to be the primary basis for security. In a pentagonal or multipower world, diplomacy can play an equally important role. And I think we have a very good example of this, Mr. Chairman, which I've referred to in my statement in the difference in the Soviet response to what seemed to me to be its two major defeats, diplomatic defeats, during the past decade: the Cuban missile crisis, on the one hand, and the rapprochement between the United States and China, on the other.

Three, it appears to me that from a military viewpoint the Third World is emerging as the principal locus of military instability and potential military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. In the past, that competition between the two superpowers was focused largely on Europe and on strategic capability. Now in both these areas, there are signs of a stabilization of relationships and a relaxation of tensions. We have arms control agreements; we have the beginnings of a detente in Europe and Ostpolitik, and movement towards a conference on European security ties.

Now none of these changes, it seems to me, are true concerning Soviet-American military relationships in the Third World. And it is in that area which I would think the greatest likelihood of some form of direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union could take place in the future. One of the striking phenomena of the past twenty-five years of Cold War has been the fact that in no case has Soviet military intervention in the politics of another society been provoked -- in no case has that military intervention provoked American military counterintervention and in no case has American intervention in the politics of another society provoked Soviet military counteraction.

In the future, it seems to me if the Soviets deploy their military forces abroad, as they assume, as it is quite proper for them to assume, a more active role militarily about the world, the possibility of some form of confrontation between the two superpowers, in terms of conventional forces outside of Western Europe, is much more likely to increase. I think this is a new problem for us and one which should be considered by the panel here today. Under what circumstances in the Third World should Soviet military intervention lead to U. S. counterintervention? What are the possibilities of reaching some sort of

agreement with the Soviet Union for mutual renunciation of the use of force and of intervention in Third World areas?

It seems to me that here is the general set of problems which will have to move to the top of the arms control negotiations at some point in the future.

And finally, I would argue in contradiction I think to what I tend to see as some of the thrusts of both Mr. Scoville's paper and the remarks of my friend, Paul Warnke. I would argue that inevitably military force must be the handmaiden of politics. There is a tendency I think for both -- in both of these papers for the use of military force, the existence of military forces to be justified solely on a military ground. Mr. Scoville says that we must confine our weapons programs to those which serve a real military purpose, and strategic nuclear power must not be thought of as a political tool. Mr. Warnke says that a numerical advantage in any part of the arms arsenal is without military meaning; it should have no real political potential. This, I take, is a statement of hope and aspiration on his part, but it is, it seems to me, an aspiration which is doomed to be unrealized. And I think we must beware of getting into the justification of military forces in their own times. At the present time -- and I take it this is the main thrust of the rationale for this position on the part of both Mr. Warnke and Mr. Scoville -- at the present time the argument that military forces, particularly at the strategic level, should be thought of in purely military terms, is an argument against expansion of those military forces, because the argument for superiority in strategic forces now stems not in terms of military arguments, but in terms of political arguments. And I can understand the reason for making that sort of a case.

On the other hand, this is something, a relationship which normally works the other way. And I think it is rather dangerous for those who want to control our military forces to put the justification of military forces solely in military terms. And to quote Clausewitz, who Mr. Warnke and General Gavin both quoted, Clausewitz said that war had its own grammar, but not its own logic. And I think that is true of the existence of military forces. And I would hope that in our differences about the political purposes which military force are to serve, we will debate those purposes and that we will not attempt to escape from such a debate by putting the justification for the existence of military forces and their deployment solely in terms of military purposes. All too often in the past, that is what we have done in our discussions of defense policy in this country, and it has led to some very unfortunate results.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Thank you, Mr. Huntington.

If I may just try to summarize, I see a common agreement that the exercise of military power must be called upon when, indeed, our national security is endangered. I see some differences,

however, as to when and where and what is in our national security. For example, Secretary Warnke said few instances are of special concern to our national security, while General Lemnitzer said it is in our national security to uphold treaty commitments. I believe most all of you agree that military power does not necessarily resolve some of our difficulties, that the military strength of a country does not necessarily preserve peace except in certain areas.

There seems to be strong agreement, of course, between General Lemnitzer and Mr. Warnke that in Western Europe NATO is very important and our commitment there must not be abrogated. In the past, we have been accused that we had overlooked or just set aside or paid no attention to other areas of the world which then brought trouble. We had practically completely shown no interest in Asia, for example, or in Latin America for decades. We find ourselves with problems there.

I would want to, one, see if we could get some discussion on what is truly in our national interest, what are the instances. And is it not true -- or let me rephrase that question. Should all powers perhaps review and abandon some of their commitments; the United States on their part, the Soviet Union on theirs? Because Mr. Gelb, I believe you had stated in an article that I'd seen that the Soviet Union, for example, will continue its military commitments to Hanoi, as much as we would not stop our military commitments to Saigon. If we are, as a nation, committed by treaties -- as General Lemnitzer says, these commitments and treaties must be maintained in our national security -- if the Soviet Union -- and I see there's again general agreement that the only power that we now have to be concerned with is the Soviet Union because of its massive military strength and not really be concerned about the smaller nations. Yet if we do, as the Soviet Union has, commitments to smaller nations, will not the Soviet Union and the United States indeed be sucked in as long as we have these commitments when there is a confrontation or a problem by a smaller country with whom we do have, or the Soviet Union has, a commitment?

Therefore, I wonder if we could just discuss this. And this is a rather general statement and probably not an accurate summary. But it does pose this question. Should we not perhaps review our commitments, and would not the Soviet Union, since these are the two powers, although we are now in a multinational world power alignment? But since we do have our greatest threat from the Soviet Union, these commitments we have and the Soviet Union have must be reviewed if we're going to have, indeed, a lessening of our armaments on the part of the two great powers.

And Mr. Etzioni on this. Professor, please.

PROFESSOR ETZIONI: I believe it's a very worthwhile

question. It took me several hundred pages to express my view on this in a book called "Winning Without War." But let me just try to briefly summarize.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: I had your book in mind when I raised the question.

PROFESSOR ETZIONI: Thank you, sir.

I think an analogy may help. We have in our economy competition between very large corporations. But there is also usually an arrangement that certain things are not allowed. So, for instance, the car manufacturers do not engage in undermining each other's prices to the point it would destroy each other. They compete in quality of cars, the safety of cars, but they usually don't engage in price warfare. When it happened in gasoline, they very quickly, after limited escalations, curbed themselves because a continuation of undercutting each other's prices would destroy all the corporations involved.

Now when you talk about international commitments, the choices are not limited to either withdrawing to America and forgetting all our allies and friends or third nations, or our jumping in there with both feet each time.

So it becomes a question of what kind of commitments are safe for competition. That very distinction already has one very important conclusion. If you say let's compete, for instance, with economic development aid, let's compete with education, let's compete with ideas, as it's been said here earlier today, that implies saying to the other guy, "Now, let's see what you can do." That would be already quite a shift of policy.

I visited, as a guest of the State Department, nineteen countries. And in most of them, we use our best to prevent the other side from entering economically, culturally or on the educational level. So for instance, in Bolivia we put pressure on the Bolivian government not to allow a Soviet airline, international airline, to get landing rights there and such.

So I think one of the first things one must recognize is we should welcome competition in nonmilitary means.

Secondly, if we come to military means, I think it's important to draw a sharp line between providing a country with funds, as we've been doing for many years in Asia, in Latin America, and all over the place, even with the indirect, direct funds for military purpose, for defense budget, as we did on a very large scale for Turkey and Pakistan, Korea and such. So it's one matter providing hardware and arms to countries and quite a different business to send in manpower.

And there have been several statements made here today,
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which I don't fully understand, which suggest there was no American military involvement in Asia, you know. It's probably just a question that I misunderstand the wording. I mean there are American men fighting in Vietnam and no Soviet [word unintelligible]. So there is a certain asymmetry. And it is important to have some steps there so we don't run up the escalator so easily.

I personally would favor a world in which nobody resorted to arms at all. But as long as we have local brush fire situations -- and I think it's not practical to prevent the sides from projecting themselves culturally, commercially or even with funds, and possibly it's impractical, other than a mutual agreement, to refrain from shipment of materials -- I think the most important, the most dangerous step on the escalator comes once men are sent in. That's the reason I suggested that the Congress would consider requiring that whenever that happens it be reviewed -- it be reviewed by Congress...

So one way of protecting ourselves from premature involvements on a higher level would be to draw the line that way. The other way that has been suggested is by mutual agreement to refrain from shipping arms, like to the Middle East.

I just want to close on one note which Mr. Gelb referred to. He referred to exaggerations in reports to Congress. In other areas of our life, we recognize -- for instance, when we all file our income tax returns, we recognize the difference between an error and fraud. Now if somebody makes an error, he thinks, you know, the Soviet Union's system's going to be ready, you know, in 1972, and it's going to be ready by 1974, then maybe they're an honest error. We often have a hard time telling our own systems when they're going to be ready. But when there's clear and present evidence that people conspired deliberately to misrepresent facts to Congress, and when this is documented -- and I'm sure we shouldn't take the thing lightly -- but when it is documented, as it can be done occasionally, and that goes unpunished, the whole of the democratic process is being endangered.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: General Lemnitzer.

GENERAL LEMNITZER: I think in referring to a possible review of commitments, it's pretty difficult in some cases to define what commitments really are. Take, for example, the situation in the Middle East. I think the President, President Nixon, exposed the heart of the problem when he said that the problem in the Middle East is that there's no guarantee that the hostilities which plague that nation will not expand, both in intensity and in area.

He also pointed out that one of the great dangers in the Middle East is that the great powers' interests in that area -- and they do have economic, political and particularly

oil interests -- are far greater than their control of the situation in the Middle East. And for this reason, I feel it would be pretty hard to write out what commitments are involved, specific commitments on either side. If we go back to the establishment of the state of Israel, there're many nations in the United Nations that were involved in approving the establishment of the state of Israel back in 1948. And wherein do their commitments differ from those of the United States, as expressed?

I think one of the problems is that there're many nations who voted for the establishment of the state of Israel [who] are not very much present when they get into discussions of the situation today.

Now another commitment which I have been involved in personally in being the United Nations Commander in Korea from '55 to '57 are commitments to the United Nations Command. Korea is very much a continuation of the Iron Curtain. The Iron Curtain definitely exists between North and South Korea. And wherein do our commitments in Korea -- are they susceptible to being cast aside or reduced? I feel that it's extremely important that the United Nations Command in Korea be maintained by the sixteen nations who were the original members of that command. For my money, it is the most important element in preventing resumption of hostilities in Korea today: the viability of the United Nations Command. And the fact that there is a United Nations Command there with a United Nations commander, with representation of the United States forces is probably the principal reason for the maintenance of the status quo in Korea. There's no peace in Korea. When I was in command, I didn't even like the term armistice. I called it a state of suspended war. And I feel that there is only a state of suspended war in Korea today. There are constant efforts on the part of the North Koreans to infiltrate and subvert, come across the Demilitarized Zone. They run fast patrol boats down both coasts putting in infiltration teams and so on.

But I cite these two examples as the difficulty of evaluating and spelling out what are the natures of the United States' commitment in Korea, vis-a-vis that of the Soviet Union, for example, or in the Middle East, vis-a-vis that of the Soviet Union. It's pretty hard to define.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Mr. Warnke has something to add.

WARNKE: I think, Mr. Chairman, we have to distinguish, or at least we should distinguish, between what we refer to as our commitments and any so-called Soviet commitments. I doubt if the Soviets feel genuinely committed to any country other than the Soviet Union themselves. I don't think they've undertaken the chain of worldwide obligations that the United States has undertaken. And I suspect that the rulers in Hanoi are quite uncertain at the present time as to whether the Soviet

Union has any obligation or commitment to them at all. I think what they do is to utilize individual situations and determine their involvement in those situations on the basis of their own national interests. I think it's a pragmatic approach, and I don't think they really feel terribly bound by treaties.

I think there's a very distinct difference between the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union's relationship with those countries and our relationship with NATO. In one instance, as General Lemnitzer has said with regard to NATO, it is a collective defense, security pact in which we have undertaken binding obligations. I think as far as the Warsaw Pact is concerned, probably the countries other than the Soviet Union would be delighted to see the pact dissolved. Because what it really constitutes is a means of preserving the Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.

So I don't think we really have to think of a competing set of commitments that poses a threat of superpower confrontation. I think instead, Mr. Chairman, what we ought to do is not review and eliminate our commitments, but interpret them sensibly. And by and large, we do. I don't think, for example, that anybody seriously felt that because of the Philippines Security Treaty that we would have been obligated to go to the defense of the Philippines if they'd gone to war with Malaysia over Sabah. That would have been regarded as something that was totally extrinsic to the purpose of the treaty.

We have only one absolute commitment, and that's to the security and the survival of the United States. And all of our treaty commitments are conditioned by the fact that they state that we will respond in accordance with our constitutional processes, which means, and here I would agree with Professor Etzioni, that this should bring in the direct participation of Congress.

Now, Professor Huntington has suggested that we are living in a world which -- will live in a world which is more pentagonal. I think that probably is true. I think General Lemnitzer and Dr. Gelb and I might feel fairly comfortable in a world that was shaped like a pentagon. The real question is what are our relationships within that world. And I think, despite my friend, Professor Huntington, that one of the considerations that ought to be uppermost in our minds is to downplay the purported political significance of military power. I have not suggested that military power has no political significance. But if we have enough in the way of military power to defend against real military threats, then we have, in my opinion, plenty to defend and protect against political disadvantage. If there were no military threats, the possession of military power would be a political nullity. And I think that where our military power is politically effective it's because it has military utility.

Obviously our troops in Europe have a political implication. They mean a great deal as far as the stability of Europe is

concerned, as far as the acceptability of German military power is concerned, and as far as the reliance of the other members of NATO on our willingness to respond and, if necessary, to escalate in nuclear fashion. So that does have political implications, but it does so because it has military utility. Where something is militarily meaningless, it will have no political utility unless, as Dr. Scoville has pointed out, we manage to talk ourselves into a political disadvantage.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Granting, Mr. Warnke, that we do not have -- the Soviet Union does not have similar commitments that the United States has. But let's look at our United States' commitments. It's very interesting. On page ten of your prepared statement, you refer to what you call the special cases of Israel and Korea and you recommend continued political and military support to Israel and what seems to me to be a contradiction -- the continued liquidation of support for South Korea, a nation we have a commitment [to].

WARNKE: I don't believe, Mr. Chairman, that I suggested that we liquidate our support for South Korea. What I suggest is that we can continue to liquidate our military presence. And on this, I find myself, unfortunately, in disagreement with General Lemnitzer. I think that we have now cut down to something in excess of forty thousand. We have built up an army in South Korea which exceeds in numbers and, I believe, in military capability the army of North Korea. We have a country which is something like double the population of North Korea. We have the ability to come to their defense with our air and naval power. I find that an indefinite continuation of a ground presence in South Korea...

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Undoubtedly, there is a question...

WARNKE: ...isn't necessary and possibly a continuing irritant.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Undoubtedly there's a question. I see General Lemnitzer shaking his head as to what commitment we have in Korea.

But what I'm troubled with is the policy that we will take as far as an enlightened policy as to where our commitments should be backed up with military and economic assistance -- and you point out Israel as one that we should continue. And I'm merely being the devil's advocate in saying, if we are going to continue the economic and military assistance to the government of Israel when it appears, in fact, the Arab world is more relative to our security, when General Lemnitzer pointed out the value, the strategic value of the Arab oil resources, and when you balance that off to a small nation of less than three million persons many miles away and almost totally lacking indigenous natural resources -- Israel -- where does our strategic or national

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security interests lie in this particular instance [sic]? I would like to have again a development as what -- a definition as to where our strategic interests are in order to use our military power in the future.

WARNKE: Let me respond in two ways. First of all, I don't suggest a different policy with respect to Israel than I do with respect to Korea. To the best of my knowledge, we have no American forces in Israel. I do not suggest that we put them in there. What I suggest instead is we give serious consideration to the gradual liquidation of our present American military presence in South Korea.

In both instances, I would continue economic and military assistance. I think that we undertook certain obligations in Korea. I think we can discharge those obligations. We should discharge them. But we can do so without the indefinite, perpetuation of an American ground presence there.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: But are we not indeed getting involved in other people's wars in the Middle East, using your terminology?

WARNKE: There is no question about it, Chairman Zablocki, which is why I cited it, I think in at least forthright admission of the fact that there are breaches in the unassailable logic of my position. I regard Israel as being one such instance. And I think that the emotional ties and the political potency that Israel represents in this country gives it a strategic value which has nothing to do with the size of its population or its resources. I think that if we were to stand aside and let the Arabs overwhelm Israel because we didn't supply Israel with military assistance, that our country would become far less governable than it is at the present time. And the governability of the country is an essential ingredient in our national security.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: This conversation only dramatizes our real problem is when we try to get hold of what our future policy should be. And I hope we could discuss this to a greater extent.

Mr. Scoville had a question.

SCOVILLE: I might go off the subject, so maybe we should go ahead with this.

ETZIONI: I'd like to make a brief point on the Israeli situation...

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Mr. Etzioni.

ETZIONI: I spent twenty-one years in Israel and served in its armed forces before I became an American citizen, so I have some familiarity with the situation.

I don't think you need to increase the commitment, because the notion that we should not get involved in other people's wars can be consistently maintained by saying that we should not send armed forces to the Middle East and that if we could reach an agreement with the Soviet Union that they would stop shipping arms to the Middle East, we would need not to ship any arms to Israel either. The United States could consistently, if the other superpowers would refrain from intervening in the region, stop intervening in all sense of the term -- sending military supplies, not to mention men.

So the term "involving" has to be somewhat more carefully separated: involving in what way under what conditions. I don't think there was ever a statement made that we basically move back to the mainland of the United States and never maintain any relationships to any other place, never to become involved in this confusion. What we should refrain from, first of all, is sending in manpower, which the Korean situation has suggested, which is our quickest way of getting into trouble.

The second one is whenever we can reach agreement with the other side, we should always refrain from shipping any arms...

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Then you would agree that there is some value of military assistance to countries who are in need of it when their boundaries are endangered or their very existence is threatened?

ETZIONI: Yes...

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Then no one has replied then -- or perhaps you ought to develop the third point, Mr. Warnke, when you say that we overvalue the political importance of military hardware.

Mr. Scoville.

SCOVILLE: It seems to me that one of the problems with military power is that military power has some effectiveness and some political effectiveness, I will agree with President Huntington, although I don't think I'd go as far as he does. And I'd certainly like to see the downgrading of the development of military power entirely for political reason when it makes no military sense.

But it seems to me military power only has effectiveness when it is not used. As soon as you start to actually apply military power and get involved in the conflict, people really find out how ineffective it is. To impose a political solution by military power I don't think is possible in this day and age. And I think Vietnam has just demonstrated that drastically. The United States has considerable national -- international

prestige, and everybody looked at U. S. military power as being dominating and overriding until we actually tried to apply that military power in Vietnam. And the Vietnam conflict just pricked the bubble. And I don't think U. S. military power is considered seriously by hardly anybody around the world today. I think if you talk about the domino effect, we were all worried about not going into Vietnam, that if we didn't go into Vietnam and exercise our military power, the domino effect would result in the collapse of all of Southeast Asia and U. S. power would no longer be considered credible.

I think by having gone into Vietnam and actually used military power, we have shown that U. S. military power is not that effective.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: But on the other hand, how would you reply to those who said since we did enter Vietnam, we indeed did not use the military power at hand to the degree to resolve that problem, that we have been fighting in Vietnam, so to speak, with one hand tied behind our backs? Now this has been a criticism.

SCOVILLE: I know it's been a criticism. All I can say is that we put in five hundred thousand men -- what was it? -- a hundred or two hundred billion dollars worth of military supplies, the most modern weapons we had, except the nuclear weapons. I would call that the application of military power. Everytime we escalated the war in Vietnam, everybody said just if we go a little bit farther, then they're going to give up. I don't see any signs of that as we've increased the bombing in the last few weeks. And I don't think there was any real hope of it all during the Vietnam conflict.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: General Lemnitzer.

GENERAL LEMNITZER: I simply can't agree with the line that Dr. Scoville is taking here. Because the application of military power to the wrong targets is not going to settle anything. And I think our trouble in Vietnam today is when we put in the five hundred thousand individuals, we didn't use military power decisively and effectively. We had a great number of restrictions where the power could be applied, how and when and where. And I think that's one of the great errors.

And I can't agree that the application of military power doesn't settle things. It settled the attempt to overrun South Korea by the communists. It settled that. And it settled Hitler's effort to take over control of the world. It settled that for once and for all.

So I say military power has a great importance and usefulness in the world, and how it's applied and so forth is another thing. In my speaking around the country attempting to put the anti-military feeling and the Vietnam war in perspective,

I point out it wasn't the military who decided to go into Vietnam, and it certainly wasn't the military who decided how the application of military power should be applied in Vietnam.

RREPRESENTATIVE PAUL FINDLEY: Mr. Chairman.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Mr. Findley.

REPRESENTATIVE FINDLEY: As I've listened to all the discussion today, I've been troubled by the attitude expressed by several witnesses on nuclear weapons and also our relationship with Western Europe. It's assumed that the two superpowers have the ability to destroy each other. [Technical difficulties.] ...As if it were American territory. What then would be the situation?

I'm not sure that our nuclear commitment has a credibility today that it once had in Europe. I question that seriously. But if our troops are removed from the continent, what really would remain of U. S. commitment to Western Europe? And if the credibility of that commitment were to diminish close to zero, as I think it would, then would be the effect upon Central Europe itself?

It's inconceivable to me that the Soviet Union would be comfortable with a West Germany which was not tied closely to the United States. I think it would seek to expand its own influence perhaps. I would doubt that it would even need to use military intervention to accomplish that. But it would, I'm sure, seek to make a whole continent of Finland-like states in Europe.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Mr. Warnke.

REPRESENTATIVE FINDLEY: I'm glad to hear from Mr. Warnke. In fact, I think he touches on that pretty directly. He criticized the President for referring to America as the peace-keeper in the Asian world. And then on page eight he refers to those allies "whose independence is integral to our own safety."

I guess my question to Mr. Warnke would be, is Western Europe -- is the independence of Western Europe really integral to our safety?

WARNKE: I think, Congressman Findley, that it is. My answer would be an affirmative one in that instance, yes. I think the fact that we've gone to war twice in the Twentieth Century to defend Western Europe is an indication that that has been our view in the past. I think it has to remain our view. I think that they have too much in the way of industrial and people potential for us to remain the kind of country that we are and want to be if it were to fall into hostile hands.

I think also, just as an indication of Soviet intentions, a Soviet assault on Western Europe would be an indication that we had miscalculated, that we were, in fact, in physical danger of Soviet attack, just as was the case with respect to Hitler's Germany. These are instances in which the hostility is so evident because of a move against American allies that we have to recognize that we ourselves are in physical danger.

And I agree, I think, with your analysis that the American military presence in Europe is an essential part of the plausibility of the American nuclear deterrent. I think that there would be a very real question in the minds of the Western Europeans; there'd be at least a niggling, hangnail doubt in my own as to whether we would respond immediately with a nuclear response to Soviet conventional aggression.

Now I think that the deterrent is a complex thing; but it's a complex of conventional capability and nuclear capability. If we have the ability to respond conventionally to a conventional attack, then you're at war. And once you're at war, the Soviet Union has to recognize the possibility of the escalator going up. And the fact that if we began to lose that war, if American troops were endangered, if Western European soil were endangered, we would inevitably, I think, after protracted or even any sort of substantial conventional war, begin to go up the nuclear ladder.

REPRESENTATIVE FINDLEY: In fact, Mr. Warnke, isn't it pretty well established that the allied forces could not sustain a broadscale convention war in Europe for even a short period of time? The escalator would inevitably be pushed up.

WARNKE: Well, I think if we had no conventional capability to withstand a Soviet conventional attack of any size, that then the chances are we would be defeated promptly and we would not have the nuclear escalation. As to whether or not we have that ability at the present time, I'm sort of in the position where some of my friends say we have it in abundance and some of my friends, like General Lemnitzer, are somewhat less certain.

I think that probably the truth is that we're not sure, and neither is the Soviet Union, and that that degree of uncertainty is perhaps -- it bolsters perhaps the deterrent.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Anybody else want to comment?

ETZIONI: Just briefly.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Mr. Etzioni.

ETZIONI: I didn't quite understand the part of the question which implied that the particular size of forces in

Europe will trigger. I would think that if fifteen hundred American boys would be killed, you know, in Berlin, that that would more or less do that particular trick. So as far as credibility is concerned in the nuclear deterrent balance, I don't see any advisable conventional force in Europe.

As to the conventional Soviet attack, I do not see why we have to provide the Europeans with foot soldiers to protect their land. And if they're unwilling or, as I'll come to in a moment, they see no danger, then I don't think it's our duty to provide them with foot soldiers.

And so I can see, especially under some kind of mutual agreement, a thinning out, a further thinning out of American foot soldiers there without in any significant way affecting the deterrent question.

REPRESENTATIVE FINDLEY: You use the word "thinning out." Am I correct, sir?

ETZIONI: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FINDLEY: In other words, not elimination. You're not suggesting the total removal of ground troops, are you?

ETZIONI: No. I think we could further reduce them substantially, as long as there's what called a [words unintelligible].

REPRESENTATIVE FINDLEY: Personally, I don't see any magic in two hundred and eighty-five thousand or five divisions, or any particular number, so long as they are rather substantial.

But what is important is how we get to, say, a lower figure. If we are going to go to a lower figure, I think it'd be tragic if we were to take that step in a manner that seems to be the total phasing -- lead to the total phasing out of our presence in Europe. If we would negotiate among our allies and agree that, well, two divisions will really suffice for the next five years, let's go to that. Then there would be the note of permanence. The ongoing character of the institution I think is vitally important.

ETZIONI: And another thing one could get in such a bargain is possibly a reduction of the Red divisions in the satellites. And that would be in itself a desirable thing. And I think the Soviet Union has considered that if we reduce -- not eliminate, but reduce the number of divisions in Western Europe, they are willing to move some of their divisions from Poland and Eastern Germany back across the Soviet borders. And I think that's basically a desirable thing. And then they move divisions back into those countries. That can be established. You can move divisions, you know, without any visibility.

REPRESENTATIVE FINDLEY: They did pretty well in Czechoslovakia, though, I might say.

ETZIONI: Yes. But, again, I'm not saying that we should unilaterally remove ours. But if we could as part of a European security conference, which we might be moving to over the next year, reach an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, [words unintelligible]. If we move some of them out of Germany, I think that would be to everybody's interest.

I think we're [words unintelligible] about Soviet intentions. And I have to share your feeling that the Soviet Union would love to dominate the world, if there would be no risks involved. And, you know, I think we would. But that's really not the issue. The issue is how many risks are they willing to take. And with one exception, the Cuban missile situation, for which Mr. Khrushchev paid rather dearly -- and I think taught a lesson to future Soviet leaders -- I think since Stalin the Soviet Union has followed an extremely conservative foreign policy. The risks they're willing to take are very limited now. The Hanoi situation in the last week -- they displayed that.

So the vision of Soviet troops marching into Western Europe, the way they marched into Czechoslovakia, I think has nothing to show in the last twenty years.

Now, I'm not suggesting -- and I don't think anybody who's sensible can suggest that therefore we should dismantle our nuclear force and send all American boys home. But if we talk about reducing our forces to a much lower level and if we talk about talking to our allies in Europe, you know, our allies in Europe say, in effect -- they show actually in their budgets -- they're not going to cough up more funds, because they don't take the threat that seriously.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Mr. Huntington...

HUNTINGTON: My comment was really going to go back to an earlier subject, Mr. Chairman.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Then we'll hold.

General Lemnitzer wanted to comment at this point.

GENERAL LEMNITZER: I do not agree with the idea of thinning out American forces in Europe. I think we've got in this country to realize we're not talking about U. S. forces alone; we're talking about a team. On a football team, you can't thin out the team by taking out a tackle or an end or a quarterback. This strength of NATO's forces in Europe doesn't come off the top of someone's head. It's carefully studied

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out, and it's related to the mission. And the mission in NATO is very simple: (a) to deter; that is, to prevent an attack on NATO's territory and people, and, (b), if detente should fail, to defend the NATO area as far forward as possible. Deterrence and defense -- that's all there is to it.

Now in order to maintain a credible military posture in Europe, you've got to have a balanced force -- land, sea and air. And we do have it now. And the reason that I make such a strong pitch toward not reducing our forces any more than they are now is because I believe they are absolutely the minimum consistent with that mission and the size of the forces across the Iron Curtain, which are massive in size.

Now we don't try in NATO to match the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact tank for tank, man for man, plane for plane. But we do want a credible military posture, which we have at the present time -- our conventional coupled with our technical nuclear capability -- and the fact and the hope that we can induce the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces from East Germany. The hundred and twenty-three thousand Americans that I mentioned in my statement didn't induce the Soviet Union to reduce one man from East Germany. They still have twenty some of their finest divisions in East Germany. And as a matter of fact, for the first time since the end of the war, or since the establishment of NATO, NATO's forces were confronted with Soviet divisions only in East Germany. And it wasn't until August of 1968 when the Soviets invaded and occupied Czechoslovakia that we now are confronted with Soviet divisions from the Baltic to the Swiss border.

The Soviets do not follow examples. And there are many advocates of examples -- that if we withdraw so many forces, the Soviets will withdraw. It has never worked; in my opinion, never will.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Mr. Warnke.

WARNKE: I would say, Mr. Chairman, that military power would play a very, very small role, if any, in bringing about autonomy for Third World countries or preserving their autonomy. I think that in most instances you're going to find that other developments will determine the extent to which they are autonomous and the extent to which they are successful.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: At this very point, Mr. Warnke, if I might propose a scenario some day in the future with China building, of course, its military power. It has a confrontation almost with the Soviet Union now. But if it decides to regain Outer Mongolia, what type of a situation do you think military power will play in that type of a scenario between the Soviet Union and China?

WARNKE: I would suspect, Mr. Chairman, that both

sides will be effectively deterred from bringing about that sort of a confrontation, because they'll be afraid of the consequences, just as I think there will be no war in Europe because both sides are afraid of the consequences. We were forced to forbear with respect to Hungary and to Czechoslovakia because of that deterrence. I think the Soviet Union is forced to forbear, whatever their aspirations may be. I think the more serious risk is that referred to by Professor Huntington, which is that at some particular point in perhaps an area which is regarded as more peripheral to our national interests, the Soviet Union might be tempted at some point to intervene directly with military forces. And that would pose a very difficult problem indeed for the United States.

Now the best answer that I have to it is that the Soviet Union probably will be deterred from direct military intervention in an area in which their interest is perhaps to them not clearly superior to that of ours. Where they are uncertain as to whether we will value the interest as highly or more highly than they do they would be afraid of a superpower confrontation and all of the consequences that would come from that.

Now I think that this is perhaps more of a hypothetical risk than it is a real one. But nonetheless, it's one that seems to me that we have to keep in mind, both in determining our foreign policy and in determining the kind of defensive forces that we need. It is why I would not feel that we could lightly discard any naval capability. We would have to have some ability to respond in the event that the Soviets were to take so rash an action as to put Soviet troops into a Third World area.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Mr. Gelb.

GELB: One cannot help but notice, listening to the remarks around the table, the difference between the thrust of the argument now and the thrust of the argument people were making, people like ourselves, five, ten, fifteen years ago. And I think our thinking has changed about United States' interests in the world, about the efficacy of military force, about the relationship between force and diplomacy.

We're talking about a world that I think has obviously changed in many, many respects. We're talking about much greater risks of superpower confrontation than ever before, primarily because of the existence of nuclear weapons. But one thing that I think has to be stressed is how quickly do you move to adjust your military capabilities to your perception of this changed world. How sure can you be that it really has changed in a fundamental way?

My guess is that it has changed fundamentally. But

my judgment is that we have to move toward the accommodation of our force posture with this new world somewhat more slowly than many are suggesting. I mean timing is a crucial question here. It's a crucial question in any decision to change our force levels in Europe or in Korea. It's a crucial question in how and when to go forward with new strategic weapons systems.

I think we have to make these changes, and we ought to take it. It gives people a chance to adjust; it gives them a chance to see if the change is not destabilizing and it doesn't imperil their security. We can "taste" these things when we see that they're creating domestic difficulty, and we ought to. But when we talk about where we ought to move, we also have to talk about how quickly to move there. It's integral to the other question.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Well, Mr. Gelb, let us take an instant case. There's no question that the Soviet Union is building its presence and dominance in the subcontinent of India. It has naval power now in the Mediterranean. It's entering into the Indian Ocean. This has made China very, very nervous. And I don't think the United States should use its military power to counteract that in any way.

But what is the timing of other nations in that area to be concerned with this, as commonly called, encirclement of China by the Soviet Union?

GELB: Well, I note no great concern, as far as these moves of the Soviet Union. It is true that they are operating more ship days in the Mediterranean than they ever did before. It's true that they're now sailing more often in Persian and Indian waters. But I note no particular alarm on the part of the Indian government or the other governments of the Indian subcontinent about this.

Moreover, the question for us is what difference does it really make. And here the issue is what could we do to prevent it. If they're going to sail more often in these oceans, can we stop them? Of course, we can't. Can we negate their influence by building more ships and sailing more often in these oceans ourselves? I don't think you can negate their influence simply by the fact of doing that. Once a superpower makes its presence felt, in a way it negates the military impact of the other.

Even were nations in the Indian subcontinent to worry about this or China to worry about it, I think the issue for us is again what difference does it make. And here I can't see where it would have any important impact on our national security.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Of course, the question really that must be uppermost in our mind [is] whether these increased shipping -- increased shipping on the part of the

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Soviet Union and its presence in the area is for peaceful purposes or not. What would you interpret it as?

GELB: Well, I'm sure it's to extend their influence, to make their presence felt. But there's little we can do about it. And I think there's little we should try to do about it, because it's going to make the critical difference in the outcome of any conflict in the subcontinent.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: In the presentations it was stated that the United Nations should play a more important role in future prevention of confrontation. Do you see any role of the United Nations in this instance in perhaps just discussing, either in the General Assembly or Security Council, the increased presence and what danger -- of the Soviet Union in that area and what danger it may pose?

GELB: Well, the nations of the area themselves have not saw fit to raise this issue in the United Nations councils. And I think we ought to follow their lead in this regard.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: But do you see a danger sign?

GELB: Of their increasing their number of ship days in the area? No, I see it as an attempt to expand their influence, but one that does not enjoin our own national interests.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Mr. Huntington was going to comment.

HUNTINGTON: Yes. It would seem to me, Mr. Chairman, that we could take a relatively relaxed attitude toward the Soviet deployment of their naval vessels in the Indian Ocean area. It would appear to me, at any rate, that their activity there has gone through phases, in a sense. And the first phase up until this past year, it would appear that the main impact of this was a part of strengthening Soviet relations with Indians. And Soviet military assistance certainly played a very important role in the buildup of the Indian military capacity and the development of their ability to very quickly defeat Pakistan.

Since the end of that conflict, it would appear to me that the Indians have been developing second thoughts about how desirable a Soviet basic military presence is in the area. India sees itself now as being a major regional power and playing a dominant role there. And consequently, I would think the best response from our point of view to Soviet naval activity and other activity in the Indian Ocean area would be to restore our somewhat shattered relations with India, which clearly will be the major power on the local scene. And if we have good relations with India, I think that is really all we need to protect our own interests there.

requests military assistance, you would propose that the United States give such assistance?

HUNTINGTON: I would be in favor of giving such assistance only if it seemed clearly necessary in order to counteract the role of the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean area.

UNIDENTIFIED REPRESENTATIVE: On naval policy, the U. S. has recently decided to base permanently naval personnel on Greek soil. I've heard admirals question the wisdom of locating so permanently so much of our navy in the Mediterranean. I'd like to hear the view of the panel as to the wisdom of this home-basing of naval forces in Greece. It has all kinds of ramifications, I realize. But it is a specific question that is now being considered very thoroughly in the executive branch. And of course, the Congress does have a way to influence that decision.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: General Lemnitzer.

GENERAL LEMNITZER: At the time of the Arab-Israeli war when the Soviets accelerated their presence in the Mediterranean in support of their Arab allies, there were many comments that were made that NATO was being outflanked. I took issue with the description. I said NATO was being surrounded.

I don't think NATO can accept a Soviet naval superiority in the Mediterranean. I simply don't believe that with three important allies -- Greece, Turkey and Italy -- who depend upon the Mediterranean for their trade with the outside world, for their contact with the outside world, can accept a Soviet superiority.

Now, the question is what do we do about it. The Sixth Fleet is a task force. It's an important task force, and it's the principal NATO element in the Mediterranean. And as a matter of fact, at the present time NATO does have overall superiority in the Mediterranean with the Sixth Fleet, British, French, Italian, Greek and Turkish vessels.

So there isn't a question of superiority there. The problem that the Navy faces is here is a major part, a substantial part of the United States naval forces located in an area. And in order to reduce the problem of family separations and problems of this kind, it was decided to attempt to home-port the Sixth Fleet, since it occupies the eastern Mediterranean most of the time, in an allied country, Greece. And I think it was a proper proposal; and I think it was a sound proposal. And we've had home-porting of naval vessels in Italy, and we've had it in France in the past. And I don't see anything extraordinary or out of order with home-porting U. S. naval forces that are constantly in position in the eastern Mediterranean in an allied country, a NATO country; namely, Greece.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Dr. Scoville.

SCOVILLE: Well, General Lemnitzer already partially answered the point I was going to raise. But that is the fear that the Soviets are going to have naval superiority in the Mediterranean -- it's just really not a legitimate fear in the near future. The Soviet forces -- all the figures that I've seen, unless there's an awful lot of classified information that's not available, is that the NATO forces are overwhelmingly dominant in the Mediterranean. Sure, the Russians have built up their forces. But I've never heard of any question that they're approaching superiority, and he just said that they didn't.

Now, as far as basing the forces in Greece -- I mean the families in Greece -- it seems to me that one has to look at the political consequences of that particular action. And maybe the families are a little bit nearer if they're in Greece, but they're not that far away if they're in Italy. And it seems to me that you could well base those families in Italy where the political situation is not that extreme. And I just wonder if we really looked at the political consequences. Or I guess I really wonder whether we didn't base the families there for political reasons rather than military reasons.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Secretary Warnke.

WARNKE: Well, I think General Lemnitzer has isolated the real risk of the increased Soviet naval presence, and that's that we'll do something else to match it. I think the real problem that we're running into at the present time is that superpowers don't have very many models to go by. There's never more than one or two at any one time. And the problem as I see it is that the Soviet Union feels now that, as a great power, they have to demonstrate that by exercising the freedom of the seas and by emulating, if you will, the United States and our pervasive presence worldwide.

Now, this is very expensive. In some respects, it's risky. It also involves, because of such things as having to base dependents in Greece, a very heavy political price by the apparent willingness to affiliate ourselves with an unpopular or repressive government there.

Now it seems to me that there is something that can be done. I don't think it can be done by the United Nations. I think were the United Nations to consider the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean, that the Soviets would insist that they also consider the American presence in the Mediterranean. And it would be a question of both of us being told to go home. But both of us, of course, would be able to exercise a veto so that the caution would be really just precatory and of no practical significance.

But it seems to me, as Dr. Scoville has suggested, that we can fruitfully explore the possibility of reaching accords with the Soviet Union. We can do so particularly in instances in which the national security of neither is at stake. The national security of the Soviet Union does not depend upon its naval presence in the Indian Ocean. And it seems to me that in some of these instances, just as with respect to military assistance, we can reach agreements that will do nothing to impair the national security of either, but will free up budgetary dollars or budgetary rubles which both countries can use to their own internal benefit.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: General Lemnitzer.

GENERAL LEMNITZER: In view of the discussion here this morning, I think it would be interesting to go back to the situation that occurred after World War II at the time of the signing of the United Nations Charter.

One of the major assumptions at the time of the signing of the United Nations Charter in 1945 was that the major Western allies would act in concert to keep the peace. And think what a different world we would be in if that hope was realized. But the hope was not realized. It was shattered and shattered completely because of the efforts of the Soviet Union. I myself was involved in working out the details of the American contribution to a United Nations peace-keeping force. And with some difficulty within the United States government, we worked out a contribution of land, sea and air forces, as indeed did the British. I presume the Soviets did the same.

But when it was put up to the United Nations Security Council, the Soviets vetoed every proposal associated with that effort to establish a world -- a United Nations peace-keeping force. And I don't think there's any more chance of obtaining a United Nations peace-keeping force today than there was after World War II.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Mr. Gelb.

GELB: I'd like to try to bring together Mr. Findley's question with Mr. Etzioni's answer. The question was about home-porting in Greece. That's a question I don't think that can be answered without reference to the larger question of how many carrier task forces the United States ought to maintain. Right now we have sixteen. Unless a new one is built -- and a new one would cost one billion dollars to build, without aircraft, without supporting ships -- that number will, by the early 1980's, go down to about twelve.

And I think this all ties back to what Mr. Etzioni -- the question Mr. Etzioni raised: how do you decide what's enough? Do we need sixteen, or twelve, or six or one? To operate a

carrier task force each year costs somewhere between five hundred million and seven hundred million dollars. We don't know quite where between. But that's a lot of money. Is the weapon system worth it?

In the past, in my opinion, there has been a tendency in the Congress to say, well, if the executive branch says we need sixteen, or says we need twelve, it must be so. But I think the truth of the matter is that the executive branch makes these judgments with the same kind of guess work, with the same kind of rough estimates that the Congress does. There's nothing particularly esoteric in coming to this decision.

My point is simply this. I think there needs to be greater scrutiny on the part of everyone to demand justification of force levels by the executive branch to see really what they're based on. A colleague of mine at Brookings and myself have just completed a paper about U. S. force structure in the Mediterranean. And what we found is that one could argue a number of different ways on whether we need two carriers in the Mediterranean or one would suffice. But I think these same questions can and should be put to the executive branch, because there is no magic -- there is no magic number.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: General Lemnitzer.

GENERAL LEMNITZER: At the beginning of the conference, I rather got the idea that from several statements that were made that government witnesses appearing before congressional committees, particularly in the budget area, are very much inclined to deliberately distort, to exaggerate, and give slanted views. And I take issue with this point of view. It relates somewhat to the statement that was just made by Mr. Gelb.

Government witnesses appearing before congressional committees are doing their assigned task. I appeared before this committee nineteen consecutive years in defense of the military aid program. I prefer to call it the mutual security program. But it's a military aid program. One must remember that these people are advocates of the position that they're trying to represent, as a lawyer is an advocate of whoever he's trying to defend. And the estimates of requirements, particularly in the Defense Department, is [sic] based upon intelligence, and intelligence, the craft of intelligence is not an exact science. And I believe that the witnesses that come before congressional committees are doing their best to present their best estimate of the requirements that are needed to carry out their assigned mission. And those missions are given by the political side of this government.

As was just pointed out, you can work up a number of task forces of various kinds and dimensions in the Mediterranean. There's a question of judgments involved here. And the judgments based on intelligence are not the same as the judgments that they are put forward by advocates of their particular departments.

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who are attempting to carry out their mission in the best way they know how, does not necessarily mean that they are deliberately distorting or exaggerating or giving the wrong kind of estimates to the Congress. Because in the congressional committees themselves, there isn't always agreement within the committee staffs on the estimates that are required also.

So I'd hope that the sense of this meeting does not imply that government witnesses appearing before the various committees of Congress are doing anything but their best to carry out those jobs that have been assigned to them.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: And I would expect, giving the testimony and the facts as they are at the time they are testifying, with the change as rapid as it is, what they say one month earlier does not hold a month later.

Mr. Gelb.

GELB: Yes. I agree with what General Lemnitzer just said. I think that people coming to the Congress as advocates for the executive branch are doing their best as advocates, and they're trying to make the case for what they believe is the consensus judgment in the administration.

But in doing so, in trying to make the best case, I think it is often also the case that points get exaggerated. Let's take the debate over the last ten years about strategic nuclear forces. As you know, inside the executive branch there are various levels of intelligence with respect to strategic forces. And there is a thing called "the greater than expected threat." That in effect means -- greater than expected threat -- that here is something that is very unlikely to happen in anything approaching the near term. We, for example, talked about the Chinese acquiring a nuclear missile capability fairly early in the 1960's. But that statement, which was made publicly to the Congress, was based on this greater than expected threat; that is, something that was unlikely to happen in the sixties. And yet when the presentation of the administration's case was made, that fact was sort of eroded. In testimony it didn't come out. And what did come out was the Chinese are about to deploy serious nuclear capability. It was not also stated in making the best case that they're unlikely to deploy in the 1960's or even in the early seventies.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Secretary Warnke.

WARNKE: Just supplementing what Dr. Gelb has had to say and also General Lemnitzer has had to say, I would certainly agree with General Lemnitzer that there should be no imputation of dishonesty as far as executive witnesses are concerned. I think perhaps instead they're using an inappropriate analogy.

In many instances, the presentation is that of an advocate. But as a lawyer myself, I don't feel that that kind of presentation is the best way to get at the facts. In law, we've resorted to an adversary proceeding in which you have two lawyers on opposite sides arguing their case and, of course, trying to demolish the other side's case.

A congressional hearing on the military assistance program or on the defense budget is not an adversary proceeding, and it should not be. Perhaps recently it's become more of one. But even so, this is an instance in which Congress and the executive are engaged in a genuinely cooperative endeavor. And I feel that rather than having the executive witnesses behave as advocates, we'd end up with far sounder defense programs if this cooperative enterprise could be followed and if both sides of the case could be presented, rather than just the exaggerated case, or, as we refer to it, the worst case.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Mr. Etzioni.

ETZIONI: I'm intrigued by the fact that for the first time I do sense a measure of disagreement. I really would like to take a different position on this issue.

I don't think it's useful to talk about all government witnesses as if they're made of one cloth. I do believe that it can be documented that in some instances the information provided to Congress is not valid. And I believe that something has to be done to protect the democratic process in cases where this is demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt... But I believe the protection of the democratic process requires some additional thought about what should be done when that is documented beyond doubt.

Second, I would like to reiterate what has already been said, that the advocacy process is a way of discovering truth not when there's a one-sided advocacy. [Words unintelligible] scientific proof, which is advocated neutrally, or in the truth which comes out of the class between adversary sides. When there's a one-sided advocacy, this is not a condition for finding out the facts...

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Dr. Scoville.

SCOVILLE: To follow up on that, as you know, there is a bill before the Senate -- and I think there's a parallel bill in the House -- to modify the National Security Act to try and insure that the Congress gets a completely non-advocacy type of presentation on the intelligence on the Soviet threat. I personally support that move very much, because I, too, agree that what the Congress needs is an unbiased presentation of what the intelligence is. And while I don't claim to impugn the motives of many people who come in and advocate various defense programs based on 2002/01/23 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000100100020-4 they

present, I do think that in many cases they have been overzealous in their advocacy and have more too often -- and I too can document this very clearly -- far too often taken an interpretation of the evidence that was available and stretched it to the one percent probability without making it clear to the Congress that this is only a one percent probability. And so the Congress does not get very often what is the most logical and most likely explanation of the facts that are available.

And the most classic example of that has been in the connection with MIRV where an interpretation of Soviet testing, which was very unlikely, was put forth as the probable fact and was used to justify certain weapons programs.

Too often also they come in to the Congress when the data is only half-analyzed and take a very initial analysis of the data, which happens to support a given weapons program, and this is the impression that gets spread far and wide. And the facts take a long time to catch up with the initial explanation.

And I think there is a real need for improvement in the congressional -- the way the Congress gets its intelligence information. And I don't believe it should get it from advocates. It should get it from a group of people who have no specific program itself.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Mr. Huntington.

HUNTINGTON: I'd like to put in a word or two on behalf of advocacy, advocacy on both sides of major issues, because it seems to me that it is very unlikely, except in rare circumstances, that on any issue of foreign policy or military policy which is of any significance that Congress will be able to get a totally unbiased presentation of the facts relevant to that issue. It seems to me it's built into the nature of our government that representatives from the executive branch have to become advocates for the tradition which has been developed within their agency and within the executive branch as a whole. It would seem to me that the proper response to this is for Congress to develop the capability from private sources or from institutions and research services which are directly responsible to Congress to question the presentations of the executive branch.

Certainly one of the most thoroughly explored issues of military policy in recent years was the issue of the ABM three years ago. And that took place directly in a situation of advocacy and counter-advocacy in which the administration was arguing one position and some very well informed and well supported people on the opposite side, largely from outside the government, were advocating other positions. And it seems to me it is precisely that sort of confrontation of positions which it is in the interest of Congress to make possible. And it's then up to the Congress to be able to make the choice between

the opposing positions.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Mr. Gelb.

GELB: I'd like to take issue with Professor Huntington on that.

To me, his position rests on a confusion between advocacy and support. Of course, the executive branch comes to a decision with what it thinks makes sense, what's desirable, and its witnesses are going to have to support that position before the Congress.

The one thing that can be done is to present to the Congress the alternatives which the executive branch looked at and the reasoning as to why it reached the position which it is supporting to the Congress. Now we all know that the executive branch looks at alternatives. And yet in its testimony over the years, and even now, there's very little discussion as to what other positions were considered in arriving at the position they seek to justify.

I think it would be a useful change in the format of executive testimony to Congress were executive branch witnesses required to present such alternatives.

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI: Mr. Gelb, we come directly with the problem [sic] of executive privilege of having witnesses from the executive department who may have differed in their presentation and their discussion prior to the executive making the decision. I do want to say, however, that in the past, if time permitted, congressional committees did get diverse views, even from within the executive branch -- from the military, from the State Department, and from CIA -- on some of the issues that were discussed here on this matter. And then the Congress could make its decision.

Our time is rapidly coming to a close. And I just want to, if I may -- I'm not sure again that I'll be summarizing the discussion today. But it appears that the exercise of military power and the changing world power alignment will be, in fact and indeed, in some instances, on some level be [sic] utilized by smaller nations and, at times -- we hope that it will not happen -- but even by large military powers. The problem I think is summed up to some degree in a paper presented by Mr. Huntington when he states: "In the future countries will seek to achieve their interests in much the same way as they have in the past. When it appears that the benefits of waging war outweigh the costs, governments can be expected to pursue their interests by military as well as other means.

"What one can hope for is that governments are sufficiently informed, rational and stable so that they can appraise their interests realistically, and so that they will not be driven

by domestic political pressures or ideological fantasies to plunge their countries into military adventures from which they cannot benefit and possibly no one can benefit."

I think the problem of the world in the future in preventing, indeed deterring, war is we have a better understanding between countries. This is, indeed, a great problem, and I think it would be a subject for an entire morning of hearings.

I would want to close on this point unless there's some divergence of views on my summation. And I want to certainly thank you, Secretary Warnke, on behalf of the committee, and General Lemnitzer, Mr. Etzioni, Dr. Scalapino [sic], Mr. Gelb and Mr. Huntington for giving so generously of your time.

The committee will stand adjourned until next Wednesday, June 7th when the committee will undertake the discussion of the national security policy and the changing world power alignment and the role the economics of national security play in that area...